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J. N. Lyon*

A Progress Report on the
Canadian Bill of Rights

When the Parliament of Canada enacted the Canadian Bill of
Rights' in 1960 it injected fresh authority into the judicial power of
interpretation of federal laws. The process of interpretation of the
Bill ofRights itself has been difficult for a judiciary trained to accept
law as given and to take for granted the great creative periods and
personalities of English law without regard to the fact that much if
not most of the civil liberties tradition in English (and therefore
Canadian) law was triggered by declaratory statutes like Magna
Carta2 and the English Bill ofRights. 3
The decade and a half of existence of the CanadianBill ofRights
has seen the important questions of interpretation go before the
Supreme Court of Canada. A survey of where we have come along
the path of a Canadian human rights jurisprudence, the reasons for
the direction taken, and the possibilities for the future may be useful
at this time.
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, Hogan
v.The Queen4 and A-G for Canadav. Canard5 show where we are,
and the path from 1960 is marked by such milestones as R. v.
Drybones,6 Smythe v. The Queen, 7 Lavell v. A-G Canada,8and
Curr v. The Queen. 9 1 propose to look for trends in these cases,
consider alternative directions open in 1975, and to project present
trends ahead for another decade and a half in order to assess the
relative merits of the alternatives that remain open to the Supreme
Court of Canada.
Why bother? Surely, some will assert, the things the Canadian
Bill of Rights stands for have become luxuries we can no longer
afford as we face common threats in areas like energy supplies and
*J. N. Lyon, Professor of Law, Queen's University, Kingston.
1. S.C. 1960, c.44.
2. 25 Edward 1 (1297).
3. Statutes of the Realm VI, 142-143, 1 Will & Mary, Sess. 2, c.2.
4. (1975), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 427; 2 N.R. 343; 18 C.C.C. (2d) 65.
5. [1975] 3 W.W.R. 1; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548; 4 N.R. 91.
6. [1970] S.C.R. 282; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473; 71 W.W.R. 161.
7. [1970] S.C.R. 680; (1971), 19 D.L.R. (3d)480; 71 D.T.C. 525.
8. [1974] S.C.R. 1349; (1973) 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481.
9. [1972] S.C.R. 889; 26 D.L.R. (3d) 603.
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costs, environmental protection, unemployment and inflation, and
trends towards violence and social breakdown in both the domestic
and international contexts. If the Bill is seen as a tool to help
criminals "beat the rap", such a response is understandable, but
there will be urged here a broader conception of the Bill as setting
out the fundamental values of Canadian society in a way that can
provide some guidance in approaching all our common problems.
That is, if we can learn to "think Bill of Rights" we may acquire a
deeper understanding of our current troubles and a greater capacity
to formulate and pursue approaches to them which, if successful,
will lead to results that please us.
Beyond that, it is possible that our apparent inability to cope with
the world of future shock flows from our failure to approach that
world with a mental set built around the fairly simple set of human
values which our history suggests are truly fundamental to a healthy
society. The CanadianBill of Rights was intended to provide the
base for the necessary re-education toward such a mental set. It
speaks not just to courts of law, but to legislators, to governments
and their agents, and to the people. Legislators and governments
can do much to promote and protect the values set out in the Bill,
but the task of interpretation belongs to the courts, giving the courts
an important educative role to perform. It is not that the courts can
make law. That is for legislators. But what the courts can and must
do, I suggest, is to show how the CanadianBill of Rights allows us
to interpret the world, through specific issues, in terms of the basic
values that have produced the best of what we have in institutions
and practices.
An attempt will be made to illustrate the kind of interpretation
that would make the Bill of Rights useful in this way, using a few of
the cases that have come before the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Hogan case' ° is a good starting point. The outcome in the
Supreme Court of Canada was that the common law rule that
evidence is admissable if relevant even though illegally obtained
stands unaffected by the requirement of section 2 of the Bill that
every law of Canada shall be so construed and applied as not to
deprive a person who has been arrested or detained of the right to
retain, and instruct counsel without delay. Hogan was detained and
taken to police station to undergo a breathalyzer test. Hearing his
lawyer outside the breathalyzer room, Hogan asked to be allowed to
10. Supra, note 4.
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see his counsel before taking the test, but was refused. He then
submitted to the test and was subsequently convicted, on the
breathalyzer evidence, of driving with an excessive blood alcohol
content.
The Court did not face a Drybones issue. There was no
suggestion that any law of Canada should be held inoperative. The
question was what sanction, if any, the courts should use where
there is a clear denial of the right to counsel by a person exercising
delegated power in the enforcement of criminal law.
Ritchie J. speaking for the majority, found that there was no
causal connection between the denial of the right to counsel and the
obtaining of the breathalyzer certificate that led to Hogan's
conviction. This served to distinguish Brownridge v. The Queen"
where the Court held that denial of the right to counsel was
justification for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test so that
Brownridge was not guilty of "refusing to blow". 12 Ritchie J. in
Hogan went on to describe the British North America Act, 1867,13
as "The Constitution of Canada" in order to refute the dissenting
view of Laskin, C.J.C. that the Canadian Bill of Rights is a
quasi-constitutional instrument and to reject as an acceptance of the
American rule of absolute exclusion the conclusion of the Chief
Justice that the appropriate sanction in the case was a ruling that the
breathalyzer test was inadmissible. Ritchie J. concluded,
• . I cannot agree that, wherever there has been a breach of one
of the provisions of that Bill, it justifies the adoption of the rule of
"absolute exclusion" on the American model which is in
derogation
of the common law rule long accepted in this
14
country.
The remarkable feature of the majority judgement is that it fails
even to consider how section 2 of the Bill affects the application of
the common law rule on admissability of illegally obtained
evidence, which is itself a "law of Canada" within the meaning of
section 5(2) of the Bill. The legislative directive given the courts by
11. [1972]S.C.R. 926; 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
12. Sub-section (2) of section 235 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34
makes it an offence to refuse, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a peace
officer's demand for a sample of breath for analysis. The section, which was added
to the Code in 1969 by S.C. 1968-69, c.38, requires that the peace officer have
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the subject of the demand was
impaired by alcohol or a drug while driving or having care and control of a motor
vehicle.
13. 30 and 31 Victoria, c.3.
14. Supra, note 4 at 434; 2N.R. at 353; 18 C.C.C. at 72.
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section 2 of the Bill requires at least a re-consideration of the
common law rule, and could without difficulty be taken, along with
the Bill's preambular recital of Parliament's desire that the Bill shall
"ensure the protection of these rights and freedoms in Canada", as
requiring a construction and application of the rule that is different
to that which prevailed before 1960. That is, Parliament has given
legal status to a due process value -

the right to counsel -

which

must now be weighed against the law enforcement value which
prevailed in the pure common law.
The explanation for this crucial omission in the majority reasons
seems to be that the Bill's interpretation has developed in the
context of federal statutes and it did not occur to the Court that
federal areas of common law are as much subject to the legislative
direction of section 2 as are federal statutes.
It is important to emphasize that the argument being put forward
here is not that Parliament has indirectly repealed the common law
rule in question. Rather, it is urged that Parliament has inserted a
new consideration into the judgemental process through which the
outcome required by authority is determined, requiring something
more than a repetition of what was done before that new
consideration was injected. This does not necessarily lead to a
different result, but it does involve a re-consideration of underlying
legal principles and policies.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this decision is the obvious
confusion about the meaning of the word "policy" when used in
legal analysis. Laskin C.J.C. refers in his judgement to his
preference for a policy of exclusion over the policy underlying the
admissibility of relevant evidence, then goes on to explain his
preference. It seems obvious that he is referring here to legal policy,
that is, to the authoritative principles that provide the substructure,
or rationale, of the law. He cannot be speaking of social policy or of
some personal predilection. However, this seems not to be the
majority's understanding of what the Chief Justice means by
"policy", for Ritchie J. states that in characterizing the Canadian
Bill of Rights as a quasi-constitutional instrument" Laskin C.J.C.
"would adopt as a matter of policy for Canada, apart from and at
variance with the common law position, the rule of absolute
exclusion of all evidence obtained under circumstances where one
of the provisions of the CanadianBill ofRights has been violated."
The obvious inference that the Chief Justice has been guided by
policy instead of law indicates an equating of legal policy, or the
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policy of the law, with the broader, unstructured social policy which
all would agree cannot serve as the basis for judicial decision. More
is involved here than a failure of meeting of minds as to what the
law is, and an understanding of where the difference lies is essential
to the development of a coherent theory of Canadian law to guide
judicial decision at all levels.
Ritchie J. obviously believes that his dissenting brethren have
rejected the law in favour of what they consider a desirable policy.
This view, however, begs the very question before the Court in
Hogan, that is, whether Parliament has, by enacting the Canadian
Bill of Rights, altered the law which requires courts to admit
evidence that it is relevant even though obtained through illegal
acts. One cannot answer this question simply by laying the common
law formulation beside the CanadianBill of Rights because the two
sources speak at different levels of generality, the common law rule
being a specific formulation. One must first inquire beyond the
surface formulation of the rule in order to determine what policy the
law is pursuing through that rule, then weigh that policy against the
policy implicit in section 2(c) (ii) of the CanadianBill of Rights.
The legal reasoning required is similar to that used by the House of
Lords in the case of Conway v. Rimmer, 15 involving the question
whether the Home Secretary's assertion of privilege for departmental documents on a "class" basis is conclusive and therefore not
subject to judicial review. The House of Lords described the judicial
responsibility as one of weighing the public interest in the
confidentiality of the internal processes of government against the
public interest in the due administration of justice. In the result, the
House ruled that a court of law could inspect the documents in
question and decide which of these public interests should prevail in
the circumstances. This was a case of weighing competing legal
policies, one of them being derived from the common law rule laid
down by the House itself in the then-leading case of Duncan v.
16
Cammell Laird & Co.
Applying similar reasoning to the Hogan case, as Laskin C.J.C.
did, leads to a weighing of the legal policy favouring judicial access
to all relevant evidence against the legal policy favouring access to
competent legal advice on the part of citizens whose liberty has been
threatened by the coercive power of the state. Does the Bill ofRights
indicate that the latter is to prevail? In all circumstances or just in
15. [1968]A.C. 910; [1968] 1 All E.R. 874 (H.L. (E.)).
16. [1942]A.C. 624; [1942] 1 All E.R. 587 (H.L. (E.)).
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some? If just in some, by what standards are the favoured cases
identified?
This was the judgement the Supreme Court had to make, and the
majority chose the legal policy underlying the common law rule as
the dominant one in all cases, but not by weighing one articulated
legal policy against the other. Instead, the majority simply asserted
the continuing vitality, totally unaffected by this Act of Parliament
called the Canadian Bill of Rights, of the legal policy enacted by
judges through formulation of the common law rule in the course of
judicial decision.
The important point is that the majority decision also was based
on a policy choice, preferring one legal policy over another.
However, by expressing it as a preference for law over policy
Ritchie J. avoided the important weighing process required by a
conflict between a legal policy prescribed by the courts and another
legal policy prescribed by Parliament. He also gave the impression,
in all good faith, that the dissenting judges were importing an alien
policy from the United States whereas in fact the dissenting
judgement simply purports to give effect to the objects of the
CanadianBill of Rights as those judges understand those objects in
the context of the facts in Hogan.
The difference, in the end, is not as to what the law is on the
matter in question. That is too simple. The difference goes rather to
the most basic question of legal theory: "what is law?", and the
different conceptions of law held by the two groups of judges appear
to be such that the CanadianBill of Rights is to the majority like a
radio communication on a frequency that lies outside their receiving
band while the conceptual framework of the minority is such as to
accommodate the Bill as a source of authority for judicial decision
that is complementary to the common law.
This is not to suggest that the dissenting judgement is necessarily
sounder in law, but simply that it accords authority to both the
common law rule and the legislative imperative of the CanadianBill
of Rights. Since the majority perceived the matter as one calling for
a choice between the common law and the Bill of Rights they
necessarily accorded no authority to one or the other in the case. In
the result, they gave no weight to the CanadianBill ofRights.
The Impact ofDrybones
The decision in the Drybones case' 7 was hailed as a breakthrough in
17. Supra, note 6.
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Canadian law, and in one sense it was. However, the benefit of
hindsight allows us to see that the case has come to symbolize a
notion of judicial supremacy in the thinking of many judges and has
served to obscure the fact that the main purpose and use of the
CanadianBill of Rights, as an interpretation statute, is the judicial
supervision of administrative action, not judicial nullification of
legislation.
This effect has followed mainly because of judicial failure to
make use of the Bill as a guiding authority in interpreting federal
laws. Even without the Bill of Rights the power of interpretation in
the Canadian common law system is an important tool in protecting
individual rights and freedoms.
Parliament, by enacting the Canadian Bill of Rights, sought to
broaden the base of the judicial power of interpretation to enable
courts of law to resolve questions about the proper meaning to be
given to federal laws in favour of the protection of the fundamental
rights and freedoms of all individuals, whatever their social or
economic status. I submit that the failure of the Bill of Rights to
achieve even its minimum objects is a result of the failure of the
majority of judges on the Supreme Court of Canada to perceive the
Bill in these rather modest terms and to engage in the process of
infusing the interpretative process with the values set out in the Bill,
in the best tradition of the common law. Drybones seems to have
created a mental block, leading to a belief that vigorous
development of the Bill of Rights will lead to judicial invasion of the
proper domain of the elected legislature.
It has been Laskin C.J.C. who has shown that this fear is
unfounded, in his perceptive dissenting judgements in R. v.
Burnshine1 8 and A-G Canada v. Canard.19 In both of these cases
provincial appellate courts held provisions in federal statutes to be
inoperative on the authority of Drybones, and in both cases Laskin
C.J.C. used the Bill of Rights as authority for arriving at
interpretations of those statutory provisions which avoided
offending section 2 of the Bill and thus avoided the Drybones
outcome of inoperativeness while giving effect to parliament's will
that the bill "shall ensure the protection of these rights and
freedoms."
A brief look at each of these cases will illustrate the point being
made. In Burnshine the appellant had been convicted of causing a
18. (1974), 44 D.L.R. 584; [1974], 4 W.W.R. 49; 2 N.R. 43; 25 C.R.N.S. 270.
19. Supra, note 5.
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disturbance, an offence carrying a maximum sentence of six
months' imprisonment under the Criminal Code. However, as a
young offender Burnshine was subject to the provisions of the
Prisons and Reformatories Act, 20 a federal statute designed to
accommodate corrections policies and practices in the various
provinces to the extent that the provinces have jurisdiction over
persons convicted of offences under the Criminal Code. 2 1 This Act
authorizes the use in British Columbia and Ontario of indeterminate
sentences tacked on to minimum fixed sentences, providing for a
minimum of three months definite followed by an indeterminate
period not exceeding two years less a day. Instead of the maximum
of six months prescribed by the Criminal Code, Burnshine was
sentenced to three months definite plus two years less a day
indefinite. His loss of liberty would last anywhere from three
months plus a day to twenty seven months less a day, depending
upon the opinon of corrections personnel as to his readiness for
release.
The provision which authorized this disposition is section 150 of
the Prisons andReformatoriesAct,22 which reads as follows:
Every court in the Province of British Columbia, before which
any person apparently under the age of twenty-two years is
convicted of an offence against the laws of Canada, punishable
by imprisonment in the common goal for a term of three months,
or for any longer term, may sentence such person to
imprisonment for a term of not less than three months and for an
indeterminate period thereafter and for an indeterminate period
thereafter of not more than two years less one day
(a) in the case of a male person apparently under the age of
eighteen years, in Haney Correctional Institution
(b) in the case of any other male person to whom this section
applies, in Oakalla Prison Farm or in New Haven, or
(c) in the case of a female person to whom this section applies,
in a place designated by the Lieutenant Governor for any
such female persons
instead of the common gaol of the county or judicial district
where the offence was committed or was tried, and such person
shall thereupon be imprisoned accordingly until he is lawfully
discharged or paroled pursuant to section 151 or transferred
according to law, and shall be subject to all the rules and
20. R.S.C. 1970, c.P-21.
21. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
22. Supra, note 20.
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regulations of the institution as may be approved from time to
time by the Lieutenant Governor in that behalf.
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia, by a majority of two
to one, held section 150 to be inoperative because it authorized
harsher treatment of Bumshine by reason of age and location in
Canada, thus depriving of his right to equality before the law. The
majority thought section 150 incapable of an interpretation that was
not discriminatory. Maclean J.A. dissenting, found that the
differential treatment contemplated by section 150 is related to the
proper legislative objective of allowing those provinces with special
facilities for young offenders to use the indeterminate sentence to
make use of them and therefore does not infringe the right of
equality before the law.
The majority of six judges in the Supreme Court of Canada
adopted the theory of Maclean, J.A. that section 150 differentiates
in the pursuit of a proper legislative objective. Laskin J.(as he then
was) speaking for the minority of three, did not, however, adopt the
view of majority below that section 150 necessarily infringes the
right of equality before the law and is therefore inoperative. Instead
he observed that the "primary injunction of the Bill . . is to
determine whether a challenged measure is open to a compatible
construction that would enable it to remain an effective
enactment." '2 3 Since he agreed that the sentence imposed on
Burnshine did infringe his right to equality before the law, Laskin J.
(as he then was) directed his initial Bill-of-Rights analysis at the
sentencing judge, not at Parliament, asking whether that judge had
interpreted section 150 properly in light of the direction given by
section 2 of the Bill of Rights. He then concluded that this was
where the fault lay, and that the sentencing judge was required by
section 2 of the Bill to avoid the offending inequality by reading
section 150 as though it contained the proviso that the total of
definite and indeterminate sentences should not exceed the
maximum sentence prescribed for the offence by the Criminal
Code.
Very neatly, the will of Parliament in enacting the Bill ofRights is
thus reconciled with that Parliament's supremacy in law. The
Drybones outcome is avoided. The obvious criticism is that the
learned judge has really added an amending clause to the statute,
thus invading the exclusive realm of the legislature. Another
23. Supra, note 18 at 599; 4 W.W.R. at 65; 25 C.R.N.S. at 286.
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interpretation, however, is that he has simply overlaid one Act of
Parliament on another, giving particular expression in the context of
section 150 of the Prisons and Reformatories Act to the general
legislative standard found in the Canadian Bill of Rights, thus
avoiding the less desirable outcome of holding section 150
inoperative. By directing the main force of the Bill at the process of
administration of laws of Canada rather than their enactment he has
demonstrated the viability of the Bill in the Canadian constitutional
system.
There is an interesting precedent for this approach in Klippert v.
The Queen, 24 where Cartwright J., dissenting, drew authority from
the Interpretation Act 2 5 for interpreting the Criminal Code
provision as to dangerous sexual offenders as not contemplating
sexual offenders who, on the evidence, are not dangerous in the
ordinary sense of that word, although the plain words of the
provision appeared to include such a person. In so doing,
Cartwright J. sought to avoid what he considered a serious and
unintended infringement of Klippert's personal liberty.
The second case in which Laskin C.J.C. used the new dimension
of the power of interpretation conferred by the Bill of Rights to
avoid an outcome of inoperativeness is A-G Canada v. Canard.26 A
unanimous bench of three judges in the Manitoba Court of Appeal
had held that sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Indian Act 2 7 are
inoperative. Mrs. Canard applied for and received letters of
administration appointing her administratrix of her deceased
husband's estate and commenced an action on behalf of the estate
against the driver of the vehicle which had struck him, causing his
death. Unknown to Mrs. Canard, the District Superintendant of
Indian Affairs had already been appointed administrator of the
estate pursuant to sections 42 and 43 of the Indian Act and had also
commenced an action against the driver of the car. To resolve this
conflict Mrs. Canard brought an action against the District
Superintendant and others for a declaration that these provisions of
the IndianAct are either inapplicable or, if applicable, ultra vires or
inoperative.

24. [1967]S.C.R. 822; 65 D.L.R. (2d) 698; 61 W.W.R. 727.
25. R.S.C. 1952 c.158 (since repealed and replaced by S.C. 1967-68, c.7, now
R.S.C. 1970, c.I-23).
26. Supra, note 5.
27. R.S.C. 1970, c.I-6.
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The impugned provisions are as follows:
S.42 (1) Unless otherwise provided in this Act, all jurisdiction
and authority in relation to matters and causes testamentary, with
respect to deceased Indians, is vested exclusively in the Minister,
and shall be exercised subject to and in accordance with
regulations of the Governor in Council.
(2) The Governor in Council may make regulations for providing
that a deceased Indian who at the time of his death was in
possession of land in a reserve shall, in such circumstances and
for such purposes as the regulations prescribe, be deemed to have
been at the time of his death lawfully in possession of that land.
(3) Regulations made under this section may be made applicable
to estates of Indians who died before, on or after the 4th day of
September 1951.
s.43 Without restricting the generality of section 42, the Minister
may
(a) appoint executors of wills and administrators of estates of
deceased Indians, remove them and appoint others in their
stead;
(b) authorize executors to carry out the terms of the wills of
deceased Indians;
(c) authorize administrators to administer the property of
Indians who die intestate;
(d) carry out the terms of wills of deceased Indians and
administer the property of Indians who die intestate; and
(e) make or give any order, direction or finding that in his
opinion it is necessary or desirable to make or give with
respect to any matter referred to in section 42.
S.44(1) The court that would have jurisdiction if the deceased
were not an Indian may, with the consent of the Minister,
exercise, in accordance with this Act, the jurisdiction and
authority conferred upon the Minister by this Act in relation to
testamentary matters and causes and any other powers,
jurisdiction and authority ordinarily vested in that court.
(2) The Minister may direct in any particular case that an
application for the grant of probate of the will or letters of
administration shall be made to the court that would have
jurisdiction if the deceased were not an Indian, and the Minister
may refer to such court any question arising out of any will or the
administration of any estate.
(3) A court that is exercising any jurisdiction or authority under
this section shall not without the consent in writing of the
Minister enforce any order relating to real property on a reserve.
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Matas J. of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench held the Indian
Act provisions inapplicable to the case, but the Manitoba Court of
Appeal disagreed and went on to hold the provisions inoperative
because they denied Mrs. Canard equality in the right to apply to a
court of law for letters of administration by reason of race alone,
contrary to the CanadianBill ofRights. Here the reasoning becomes
a bit circular, however, for the objection that the Bill of Rights
cannot apply to inequalities that arise as between federal law
(Indians) and provincial law (non-Indians) has a solid base where
Indians as a group are by the Constitution committed to exclusive
federal jurisdiction. Dickson J.A. asserted that the inequality arises
through conflict between the Bill of Rights and the Indian Act, and
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada Laskin C.J.C. adopted
this interpretation in his dissent. An attempt will be made to unravel
the apparent circularity of reason when the Lavell2 8 case is
considered. But for now the point of interest is how Laskin C.J.C.
avoided the outcome of inoperativeness while reaching a conclusion
favourable to Mrs. Canard.
First, the Chief Justice found no constitutional objection to
Parliament's enacting the impugned provisions, then concluded that
sections 42 and 43 of the Indian Act did not contemplate an Indian
becoming an administratrix of her deceased spouse's estate. He
disposed of counsel's argument that nothing in those sections
prevents such an event by describing it as a completely illusory
possibility in view of the Indian Estates Regulations and the fact that
Mrs. Canard had not even been notified by the Department of the
appointment of the District Superintendant as administrator of her
husband's estate.
Finally, and most importantly, Laskin C.J.C. agreed with the
Manitoba Court of Appeal that to deny an Indian widow the right to
apply for letters of administration for her deceased spouse's estate is
to deny her equality before the law by reason of her race. However,
since section 43 of the Indian Act did not clearly prohibit such a
thing (only the regulations and the practice did), the Chief Justice
did not hold that section 43 is inoperative. Instead he stated that
section 43 must be applied consistently with section 1 (b) of the Bill
of Rights, that is, so as to permit an Indian widow to apply and to be
appointed administratrix. The regulation, however, was inoperative
because it did purport to exclude the Indian widow.
28. Supra, note 8.

A Progress Report on the Canadian Bill of Rights 51

Once again, then, Laskin C.J.C., having found a violation,
directed the force of the Bill of Rights, not at the legislation but at
those responsible for its administration, to strike down as
inoperative the subordinate legislation of one such administrative
authority, and to strike down as contrary to the Bill of Rights the
action of another.
It should be noted, however, in relation to this dissent, that if
equality before the law requires that an Indian be permitted to be
appointed administrator of his or her deceased spouse's estate, it
might be difficult to resist the claim of a reserve Indian to partition
or sale of the reserve. While there are obvious differences between a
band's relationship to a reserve and joint tenants' relationship to
land held in fee simple, these differences could be seen as simply
manifestations of a racial discrimination that became unlawful with
the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Perhaps it is this
slippery-slope character of the application of equality before the law
to the Indian Act, leading ultimately to Osler J's ruling in Isaac v.
Davey2 9 that the Act is ultra vires in toto, that makes the Supreme
Court majority hesitant to follow through on Drybones.
To summarize the point being made at some length here, the
CanadianBill of Rights is an interpretation statute that is directed
primarily at the exercise of power delegated by Parliament to the
administrative branch of government. The courts are given authority
to strike down or correct administrative decision or action for failure
to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms described in
the Bill. Only if Parliament has failed to allow sufficient lee-way to
respect these rights and freedoms, a rare event given the complexity
of the law and the flexibility of the art of interpretation, does a court
have to resolve a conflict between two Acts of Parliament. A
Drybones situation will not happen often, and for the Supreme
Court to avoid all such conflicts by giving a restrictive interpretation
to the rights and freedoms in the Bill is to stultify the necessary
growth of a sound human rights jurisprudence in order to preserve
intact the misconception that Parliament cannot create repugnancy
between two of its own enactments and delegate to the judiciary the
power to resolve the repugnancy.
The legacy of Drybones does not end there, however, for so great
was judicial concern for the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy
that not enough attention was paid to the language of section 1 of the
29. [1973] 3 O.R. 677; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 23 (subsequently reversed by the Ontario
Court of Appeal: (1975), 5 O.R. (2d) 610; 51 D.L.R. (3d) 170).
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CanadianBill of Rights. (It must be admitted that all of this comes
with the benefit of hindsight, after Lavell and other cases have
clarified the problem).
Let us assume we are facing Drybones for the first time. The
accused has been penalized for an offence which only an Indian can
commit, a special liquor offence enacted in the Indian Act. His
claim is that he has been discriminated against by reason of his race,
and thus denied equality before the law. On referring to the
CanadianBill of Rights we find that it prohibits discrimination in
two ways: first, by enacting that the rights and freedoms shall
continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national
origin, colour, religion or sex; second, section l(b) recognizes the
right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection
of the law.
Why are there two forms of prohibition of discrimination? The
apparent reason is that the first constitutes an absolute prohibition
against discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour,
religion or sex when it comes to the enumerated rights and
freedoms. Parliament is saying in effect, that there can never be a
rational justification for violating one of these rights and freedoms.
The second prohibition, on the other hand, stated by way of an
affirmative right to equality before the law, would prevent
discrimination for any reason in the application of any law of
Canada (not just in relation to the rights and freedoms found in
sectionl) unless some rational legislative purpose can be show
which justifies differential treatment.
The second form of protection is clearly the more difficult one to
apply and calls for a judicial consideration of all the facts and all
relevant law and its purposes, followed by a judgement as to
whether there is an inequality that is proscribed by theBill ofRights.
The Supreme Court treated Drybones in terms of equality before the
law, thus maximizing the difficulty and the scope for disagreement
among judges.
Was this the proper approach? I submit that it was not and that we
are paying heavily for the wrong choice.
Drybones' complaint was one of racial discrimination, which is
prohibited absolutely with respect to the enumerated rights and
freedoms. Therefore, the court should have enquired whether one of
the other enumerated rights and freedoms had been abrogated,
abridged, or infringed by reason of race before resorting to the more
general ground of equality before the law.
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What had been done to Drybones in the name of a law of Canada?
He had been fined ten dollars, that is, he had been deprived of the
enjoyment of property by reason of his race. This is easily tested by
asking whether in the same circumstances a non-Indian could be
deprived of the enjoyment of property. The unqualified negative
response supports the conclusion that Drybones' deprivation of
property occurred by reason of race, contrary to the Bill of Rights.
The separate right not to be deprived of the enjoyment of property
without due process of law was not in issue. Presumably Drybones
was given a fair trial, with full respect for his procedural rights. His
complaint was that the convicting magistrate had, in fining him for
contravening section 94 of the Indian Act, applied that section so as
to infringe Drybones' right to the enjoyment of property without
discrimination by reason of race.
This way of interpreting section I of the CanadianBill of Rights
may seem strained to those accustomed to the equality-before-thelaw rationale used inDrybones but its value becomes apparent when
it is applied to the Lavell 30 case, for the analysis that was applied in
Lavell by the Supreme Court had the effect of denying Mrs. Lavell
the potential benefit of the Bill's absolute ban on discrimination
by reason of sex by submerging that ban in the more tenuous right to
equality before the law. The Court asked itself whether these
women had been denied equality before the law by reason of sex.
This was the wrong question to ask. It had the effect of reversing the
order of priority of the absolute and conditional bans on
discrimination contained in the Canadian Bill of Rights, and it
enabled the majority to avoid facing the question of discrimination
by choosing an interpretation of equality before the law that
excludes inequalities within the statute and covers only inequalities
in the applicationof a statutory provision.
This interpretation of equality before the law might well be
appropriate, indeed might be essential to judicial restraint, if
equality before the law were treated separately from the
absolutely-prohibited discriminations stated in the opening paragraph of section 1 of the Bill as a kind of second line of defence
against discrimination for any reason. However, it is not an
appropriate interpretation when it is applied to a fused application of
the two prohibitions against discrimination in a manner that permits
denial of one of the Bill's rights or freedoms by reason of sex. And
that is what happened inLavell, as I will now try to show.
30. Supra, note 8.
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Mrs. Lavell's complaint was that she had been subjected to
discrimination by reason of sex when she was struck off the Band
List following her marriage to a non-Indian. The appropriate
question for the Supreme Court to ask was whether she had been
denied one of the rights or freedoms set out in section 1 of the
CanadianBill ofRights as a result of that discrimination (assuming,
as was the case, that the differential treatment for women was
established). If this question receives an affirmative answer without
resort to the right to equality before the law, there is no need to go
on to that back-up provision, for an abrogation, abridgment or
infringement has been shown in terms of an absolutely-prohibited
discrimination and the Court must search for a construction of the
provision in question (section 12 (1) (b) of the Indian Act,
reproduced below) which does not result in such discrimination for
the guidance of the person charged with the administration of this
part of the Indian Act. If none can be found, the provision is to be
held inoperative on the authority of Drybones.
The Supreme Court asked only whether Mrs. Lavell had been
denied equality before the law by reason of her sex, and on the
majority's Dicean interpretation of "equality before the law" there
had been no such denial. There is much to be said for the majority's
interpretation of "equality before the law", provided this bar to
discrimination is seen as a supplementary one, directed at the
exercise of administrative power, leaving the protection against
legislative discrimination to a proper application of the opening
paragraph of section 1 of the CanadianBill ofRights.
I will try to show how this application of the CanadianBill of
Rights might work.
Mrs. Lavell, while a registered Indian, married a non-Indian,
resulting in her name being struck off the Indian Register pursuant
to section 12(1) (b) of the Indian Act, which provides:
The following persons are not entitled to be registered, namely,
(b)

a woman who married a person who is not an Indian, unless
that woman is subsequently the wife or widow of a person
described in section 11.

Indian men who marry non-Indian women do not suffer a similar
loss of status.
Since there is obviously discrimination by reason of sex in this
situation, the first question is whether any of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms set out in section 1 have been thereby
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abrogated, abridged, or infringed. Even a person not familiar with
Indian ways should appreciate that loss of status, without which a
person cannot be on a reserve as of right, must have an adverse
effect on the security of the person. Because exile has largely
disappeared as a legal sanction we tend to take for granted that part
of personal security that goes with our freedom of movement. Just
consider, for example, how it would affect any of us if a law were
enacted that took away our freedom to go back to our home towns to
visit our families, relatives or friends. This is what the application
of section 12(1) (b) did to Mrs. Lavell, and it should not be difficult
for a court of law to equate it to an infringement of the right of
security of the person.
Secondly, given the fact that the Crown in right of Canada holds
title to Indian reserves for the use and benefit of the various bands, it
is not difficult to grasp that the reserve is the common castle of all
the members of a band. It is a form of communal property, adapted
to the system of English land law imposed as to all public lands in
Canada. Therefore, Mrs. Lavell's status as a registered Indian
carried with it a right of enjoyment of property in common with the
other members of the band. This right has been abrogated by section
12(1) (b), as applied by the Registrar.
There is a red herring to be disposed of here. It might be argued
that the various rights set out in section 1(a) of the Bill ofRights are
all subject to being taken away or altered by due process of law and
that Mrs. Lavell has had due process through the fair and proper
application of section 12 (1) (b) of the IndianAct.
Due process is not an issue in this situation. Section 1 does not
say that one's right against discrimination by reason of race or sex,
etc. can be taken away by due process of law. Analytically, section
1 means that all persons, whatever their race, sex, etc. have the
following two sets of rights:
1.
2.

the right to life, liberty, security of the person and
enjoyment of property,
the right to due process of law (i.e. fair and lawful
procedures) before being deprived of any of the rights listed
in 1.

That is, paragraph (a) of section 1 makes up a package of rights,
and the whole package is subject to an overriding protection against
those forms of discrimination considered by Parliament to be
inherently wrong.
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Mrs. Lavell's complaint was not one of denial of due process. It
was one of discrimination by reason of sex, and it is a prior
requirement to due process of law that the law being applied should
not, by reason of one's race or sex, etc., deny the right to, say,
enjoyment of property.
Applying section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights, we find
Parliament ordering that every law of Canada shall be so applied as
not to abrogate, abridge or infringe the right of the individual to
security of the person and enjoyment of property without
discrimination by reason of sex ("liberty" could easily be added
since exile to the white man's world can be a form of imprisonment
to a reserve Indian).
It seems clear that the Registrar's application of section 12(1) (b)
is in violation of this mandate. The next question, then, is whether
the Court can provide the Registrar with a legal construction of the
Indian Act which will avoid this effect. The value of the dissent in
Burnshine3 ' is that it shows how Parliament, by enacting the
Canadian Bill of Rights, has broadened the judicial power of
interpretation so that courts of law may avoid some injustices that
would otherwise occur in some cases. That is, Parliament, by
enacting the Bill, has infused all laws of Canada with some
overriding policies based on fundamental values, from which judges
are entitled to draw a few more inferences about legislative policies
than they were previously able to do. But the added judicial power
is limited and a judicial finding of inoperativeness is preferable to an
interpretation that strains judicial credibility. In Burnshine there
were three federal statutes interacting the Prisons and
Reformatories Act, the Criminal Code and the Canadian Bill of
Rights. The proviso inferred in the PrisonsandReformatoriesAct by
Laskin C.J.C. in his dissent, was capable of being supported by the
Criminal Code's prescription of a maximum of six months for the
offence in question. In Lavell there seems to be nothing in the
Indian Act to support a construction of section 12(1) (b) that would
avoid the abrogation of one human right (the enjoyment of property)
and the infringement of another (security of the person) by reason of
sex. The conclusion, then, is that Parliament has suspended the
operation of section 12(1) (b) as of 1960, and the court should
accordingly have held it inoperative.
If this result is not consistent with present Indian values, and
there is plenty of evidence both in the Indian Act and in Indian ways
31. Supra, note 18.

A Progress Report on the Canadian Bill of Rights 57

that Indian culture still sets basically different roles for men and
women, then perhaps anon obstante clause for the whole IndianAct
would be the best way to free the development of the CanadianBill
of Rights of these nearly insoluble problems until a new, modem
Indian Act becomes politically feasible.
Cases arising under the Indian Act are distorting and stunting the
growth of a human rights jurisprudence in Canada, because of
understandable judicial reluctance to embark on a virtual reenactment of that Act. This is the obvious lesson of the majority
judgement of Ritchie J. in Lavell. The Constitution itself sets aside
Indians as a race for special treatment. In view of this fact, it would
be rather surprising if the laws of Canada did not discriminate
against Indians, even as to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The Indian Act is inherently repugnant to the opening paragraph of
section 1 of the Bill of Rights, and many of its provisions no doubt
abrogate, abridge or infringe the Bill's declared rights and freedoms
quite apart from the right to equality before the law. Judicial
awareness of this inherent conflict has led the Supreme Court to
treat Indian cases in terms of equality before the law, thus
permitting the court to avoid the question of racial discrimination by
giving a narrow interpretation to "equality before the law." And
beyond this awareness lies the deeper concern, expressed in Lavell,
that it is the Constitution itself that commands differential
treatment by reason of race. Absent the right to equality before the
law, the conflict could be resolved by asserting that Parliament has
declared its intention to stop differential treatment of Indians only in
relation to human rights and fundamental freedoms. But the right of
an Indian to equality before the law without discrimination by reason
of race leads either to the narrowing of "equality before the law" to
the Dicean form seen in Lavell or to Osler J's conclusion that the
whole Indian Act is contrary to the Canadian Bill of Rights and
therefore inoperative.
If the federal government had the courage to remove the Indian
Act from the force of the CanadianBill ofRights and to undertake a
program of affirmative action to end the worst racial discriminations, the Supreme Court would be able to apply its interpretative
skills to realizing some of the fundamental values the Bill ofRights
was designed to secure more fully in Canadian law.
It is worth considering one more case involving the Indian Act,
and the Canard3 2 case is a good one because of the judicial
32. Supra, note 5.
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disagreement as to the proper outcome. It will be recalled that Mrs.
Canard obtained under the Manitoba law letters of administration
for her deceased husband's estate and commenced an action arising
from his death, only to learn that the Minister had appointed the
District Superintendant as administrator pursuant to the IndianAct.
It is worth noting the underlying wrong done to Mrs. Canard,
which flowed not so much from the law itself as from the way she
was treated by the responsible government official and which is
stated simply by the Manitoba Court of Appeal as follows:
Mrs. Canard was not told by the Department that Mr. Rees had
been appointed administrator of the estate of her late husband,
nor was she told that an action had been commenced on behalf of
the estate to recover from those allegedly responsible for the
death of Mr. Canard. 33
All judges in the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that sections
42, 43 and 44 of the Indian Act are intra vires as enactments in
relations to Indians, but from there they divided. The majority
decided that those provisions applied and did not offend against the
CanadianBill of Rights, so that Mrs. Canard was not free to obtain
letters of administration under provincial law. Laskin C.J.C.
dissented, with Spence J., finding that nothing in these provisions
forbade the Minister to appoint Mrs. Canard administratrix and that
her right to equality before the law without discrimination by reason
of race compelled this application of the IndianAct.
The dissenters have, I suggest, repeated the Drybones confusion
of the absolute ban on racial discrimination in the opening
paragraph of section 1 of the Bill with the qualified ban on
discrimination on any ground based on the right to equality before
the law. The result is a blunting of the Bill of Rights as a tool for
judicial protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
If we can unravel the confusion in the Canarddissent it will help
to clarify the foregoing analysis and to indicate the best prospects
for future development of the CanadianBill ofRights.
First, however, we should try to clarify the legal position of
Indians in Canada. Indians, as persons, are committed to the
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada. This means,
apparently, that Parliament could enact a comprehensive code of
Indian law which would subject Indians to laws that are totally
different to the fused federal and provincial laws that apply to other
33. Canard v.A-G Canada (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 9 at 13 (Man. C.A.).
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Canadians. At least, this must be true to the extent that the separate
laws or the differences between them and other laws go to the
Indian-ness of Indian people. That is, the fact that a law applies to
Indians and to Indians only may not by itself make it a law in
relation to Indians. The law might have to be shown to relate
somehow to the special character of Indians in order to qualify as a
law in relation to Indians.
Whether Parliament has a comprehensive authority to regulate the
affairs of Indians or only authority to provide for their special needs
as Indians is in part academic since Parliament has engaged in
wholesale adoption of provincial laws to fill whatever gaps in Indian
law are left by the IndianAct. Section 88 of the Act provides:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the
Parliament of Canada, all laws of general application from time
to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of
Indians in the province, except to the extent that such laws are
inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law
made thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make
provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under
this Act.
Thus, in the absence of sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Indian Act
the law of Manitoba would have applied, either in its own right or
by virtue of federal adoption as part of the Indian Act. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal has, by a majority, taken the view in Re
Adoption Act 3 4 that section 88 merely defines the obligation of
Indians to observe provincial law. This suggests that a law in
relation to Indians means any law enacted by Parliament that
Applies to Indians only.
In Canard the minority in the Supreme Court of Canada found
that application of sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Indian Act in the
manner done in that case led to an inequality before the law between
Mrs. Canard and other persons in Manitoba by reason of race. They
concluded that the Minister was bound, therefore , to apply those
sections by appointing Mrs. Canard administratrix. As in
Burnshine,35 this approach has the virtue of avoiding the Drybones
outcome of inoperativeness. However, I suggest it is mistaken and
that the error originated inDrybones.
Mrs. Canard's complaint is one of differential treatment because
of race. That is not necessarily the same as racial discrimination in
34. (1974),44 D.L.R. (3d) 718 (B.C.C.A).
35. Supra, note 18.
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the wrongful sense, for as Ritchie, J. pointed out in Lavell the
Constitution calls for differential treatment of Indians.
The first question, then, is whether Mrs. Canard has by reason of
her race, been denied any of the rights and freedoms set out in
section 1 of the Bill of Rights. It would strain judicial credibility to
hold that right to be eligible for appointment as administratrix of the
estate of one's spouse is included in the right to life, liberty,
security of the person and enjoyment of property. This seems to
leave only the right to equality before the law and the protection of
the law.
Here we encounter a qualified ban on discrimination, for if it can
be shown that differential treatment is based on some rational
legislative objective and is justified by differing circumstances, it
would require a doctrinaire interpretation of "equality before the
law" to find the differential treatment contrary to the Bill ofRights.
Since sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Indian Act were enacted in
good faith for an obviously legitimate purpose, I suggest, it is best
to leave out discrimination by reason of race in considering the
Canard case and concentrate on equality before the law. This
narrows the question to a manageable one. The Indian Act puts the
administration of Indians' estates in the discretion of the Minister,
for the same paternalistic reasons as motivate not only the whole
Indian Act but head 24 of section 91 of the B.N.A. Act as well.
However, the Act does not forbid the appointment of an Indian as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased spouse. The Act thus
permits the Minister to consider in each case those factors that go to
the justification of the general paternalism of sections 42, 43 and 44
(e.g. ability to manage one's affairs, competence to instruct legal
counsel and receive legal advice) to see whether it is necessary in
the case. If it is not, then he is free to treat Indians in the same way
as other citizens are treated in this matter.
Thus the Minister is free to appoint an Indian spouse
administratrix. The question is whether the law requires him to do
so in any circumstances. The only law that might so require him is
the CanadianBill of Rights, and the argument would be that in a
case where it is shown that the circumstances that are claimed to
justify differential treatment do not exist, equality before the law
requires that, if possible, the law be applied so as to accord the
person in question equal treatment.
The trouble with this is that it begins the process of judicial
erosion of the Indian Act, for if the application required is not
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possible within the bounds of legal interpretation, then the
alternative is to hold the enactment in question inoperative. This is
where the wisdom of Ritchie J's position in Lavell begins to
emerge, however questionable his resort to Dicey may be thought to
be. The use of equality before the law as a tool for supervising the
administrative application of the Indian Act is manageable, but
when applied to the legislative application of power conferred by
section 91(24) of the BNA Act it puts the Court in the position of
trying to revise the Indian Act according to the fundamental values
of non-Indian society, a task that is perplexing the Federal
Government itself because of its complexity and the absence of
consensus on much other than hostility to the present Indian Affairs
Administration.
On balance, I suggest that both the reform of Indian law and
practice and the sound development of the CanadianBill of Rights
would best be served by inserting in the Indian Act a provision
stating that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of
Rights. Then the spotlight could be directed where it belongs - on
the Indian Affairs Branch of the Federal Government rather than the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The most important effect of such a move would be to free the
concept of equality before the law from its association with racial
discrimination, permitting the Supreme Court to develop a judicial
conception of equality before the law based on justified differential
treatment in the pursuit of rational legislative objectives. The Court
began to work towards such a conception in Burnshine, where it
indicated that the use of varying sentencing practices in criminal
justice, depending on age and province, could be seen as related to
the object of allowing provinces to use their personnel and facilities
designed for young offenders.
Any non obstante clause added to the Indian Act should make
clear the reason why it has been added. Perhaps something like the
following might be enacted by way of amendment to the Act:
Whereas Parliament is by the British North America Act, 1867,
charged with the responsibility for making laws in relation to
Indians and lands reserved for the Indians,
AND Whereas the promotion and protection of the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of Indians can be achieved most
effectively through legislative and administrative reforms carried
out in consultation with Indians.
The Indian Act, Being Chapter 1-6 of the Revised Statutes of
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Canada, 1970, is amended by adding the following as section 1A:
1A. This Act shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of
Rights.
As suggested above, such removal of Indian laws of Canada from
the legal application of the Bill of Rights would enable the Supreme
Court of Canada to come to terms with the right to equality before
the law and the protection of the law.
The Smythe 3 6 and Burnshine37 cases provide two illustrations of
how this development might go. In Smythe the argument made was
that equality before the law required that those charged with evasion
of income tax and related offences should all be tried either on
indictment or by way of summary conviction. The same offence
should not carry optional procedures and minimum sanctions,
depending on the election of the Attorney General. If the distinction
our law makes between indictable and summary conviction offences
is one that can be justified in pursuit of a rational legislative
purpose, then the only remaining question is whether the delegation
of a discretion to the Attorney General is necessary to the pursuit of
that purpose. Most criminal offences fall into either the indictable or
summary conviction category by their very nature, and the old
distinction between theft under $50 and theft over $50 shows how
the seriousness of an offence can be quantified where it is an offence
against property. To justify delegating to the Executive the task of
separating instances of the same offence into indictable and
summary conviction categories would probably require a showing
that seriousness of the offence of evasion of income tax and making
false and deceptive statements in income tax returns cannot be
quantified in terms of the amount of tax evaded, either alone or in
combination with other factors that can be given legislative
specification.
True, Parliament could have listed the factors to be considered by
the Attorney General in exercising the discretion, but it seems likely
that such a listing would add nothing to what can be readily inferred
from the criminal law in the light of its history and purposes.
Discretions breed arbitrary action, however, and it may be that
due process of law, taken together with the right to equality before
the law and the protection of the law requires that Parliament enact
some objective standards according to which the Attorney General
36. Supra, note 7.
37. Supra, note 18.
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must make his decision whether to indict or to proceed by way of
summary conviction.
The Supreme Court was clearly reluctant in Smythe even to
38
consider holding section 132(2) of the Income Tax Act
inoperative, knowing as it did that a similar discretion exists with
respect to a number of criminal offences. But instead of just saying
that this is part of the Canadian concept of equality before the law,
the Court might have considered whether the Attorney General
could be required by the Canadian Bill of Rights to exercise his
discretion differently then he did in this case.
One possible way to avoid aDrybones outcome without asserting
that arbitrary or discriminatory treatment are part of the Canadian
concept of equality before the law would have been to hold that the
Bill of Rights requires the Attorney General to state his reasons for
choosing indictment rather than summary conviction and that the
reasons stated be sufficient to justify the differential treatment from
those proceeded against by summary conviction. In this way
Parliament's freedom to delegate wide discretions would be left
untouched and the Bill of Rights brought to bear on the
administrative exercise of those discretions in a way that is
consistent with basic principles of administrative law.
This approach to reconciling judicial intervention under the Bill
of Rights with parliamentary supremacy was followed by Laskin J.
(as he the was) in Burnshine. Having found that Burnshine's right to
equality before the law was infringed by the sentencing magistrate's
application of section 150 of the Prisons and Reformatories Act,
Laskin J. held, in effect, that the sentencing power conferred by the
provision is contained within the maximum penalties provided by the
Criminal Code. That is, on the authority of the Bill of Rights,
Laskin J. inferred that Parliament did not intend to alter the outer
limits on sentencing which form a vital part of the CriminalCode.
Suppose Parliament were to amend section 150 by adding the
following clause:
even though the resulting aggregate of definite and indeterminate
periods exceeds the maximum sentence prescribed by the
Criminal Code.
This would preclude the interpretative approach taken by Laskin
J., leaving as the only alternative a finding that section 150 is
inoperative, as a majority in the British Columbia Court of Appeal
38. R.S.C. 1952, c.148 (now R.S.C. 1970, c.I-5).
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held it to be. But such an amendment to the Act would also make it
clear beyond doubt that differential treatment is intended in the
pursuit of some objective. The question then becomes whether the
objective is rational (this would virtually be presumed in relation to
current legislation) and whether the differential treatment is
necessary to the pursuit of the objective. An affirmative response to
both of these questions is at least implicit in the majority judgment
inBurnshine.
The interesting thing is that legislative vagueness leaves room for
an interpretative approach directed at administrative action,
especially where the legislation pre-dates the Canadian Bill of
Rights and is therefore subject to such inferential modification as is
possible short of express reenactment and where it is not
unreasonable to infer that Parliament intended judicial interpretation
to serve as the vehicle for such modification. Where, however,
legislation is reasonably clear in its prescription of differential
treatment the courts can and should bring to bear a conception of
equality before the law based on what is justified in the pursuit of
rational objectives, such as to permit them to discharge the
responsibility conferred on them by the CanadianBill of Rights
without intruding on the domain of Parliament any more than is
necessary. We should not forget that it was Parliament that enacted
the Bill of Rights, so that if some judicial intrusion on the usual
legislative domain is necessary to "ensure the protection of these
rights and freedoms in Canada", in the words of the Bill's
preamble, that must be taken to be a consequence intended by
Parliament itself and therefore required of the courts.
The removal of the IndianAct from judicial application of the Bill
of Rights would greatly reduce the potential for cases where an
interpretative approach, directed at administrative action, would not
be enough to give effect to the bill.
We return to our starting point, Hogan v. The Queen,3 9 to
consider where the CanadianBill of Rights might lead us if it were
directed at the exercise of delegated power, as it should be, and
freed by a non obstante provision from the inhibitions caused by a
constitution that calls for separate treatment of Indians and by an
Indian Act that fulfills those expectations by enacting special laws
that apply only to Indians.
39. Supra, note 4.
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How might the Supreme Court have disposed of the Hogan case?
First, it might have asked who is the public authority whose exercise
is claimed to have violated the Bill of Rights. The police officer's
application of his power to arrest and detain in a way that abrogated
Hogan's right to counsel is beyond recall, so that the Court's
concern shifts to the trial judge whose conviction and sentence are
not beyond recall. What is the law of Canada whose application by
the trial judge is said to have abrogated, abridged or infringed one of
the Bill's rights and freedoms? It is the common law rule that
evidence is admissible in criminal prosecutions as long as it is
relevant, even though it was obtained through an illegal act.
This rule pre-dates the Canadian Bill of Rights. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider whether the Bill now requires the rule to be
applied differently, in order to avoid abrogating, abridging or
infringing any of the rights or freedoms for whose protection the
judicial power of interpretation has been broadened by the Bill.
Hogan was wrongfully denied his legal right to retain and instruct
counsel without delay. He then submitted to a breathalyzer test,
which provided evidence of a criminal offence.
It is important to identify accurately the right or freedom affected
by the admission in evidence of the result of the breathalyzer test.
Due process of law is an attractive generality but is not, I submit,
the appropriate formulation here. Rather, it is Hogan's right to the
protection of the law, specified in section 1(b) of the Bill ofRights.
The analysis is as follows: the police officer has infringed
Hogan's right to counsel, a right specified by the Bill of Rights
itself. The trial court, by admitting in evidence the result of the
breathalyzer test, has abrogated Hogan's right to the protection of
the law, one of the Bill's enumerated human rights, for the only
effective protection against illegal conduct by police is, I suggest,
the withholding of judicial support of that conduct.
The protection of law is what courts of law are about. Many
violations of human rights never come to the attention of the courts
and are therefore immune from any kind of judicial sanction, so that
when a clear and deliberate official denial of a basic human right
does come to a court's attention in a case there should be no
reluctance to use judicial power to ensure the protection of the law.
Can the judicial power of interpretation be used in a case like Hogan
to give effect to the individual's right to the protection of the law
that entitles him to access to legal counsel? The basic legal rule
being applied is the rule that admissability of evidence is based on
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relevance. Absent the Canadian Bill of Rights this rule has been
construed as operating without regard to the legality of the
evidence-gathering activities. If this construction of the rule results
in denial of the right to the protection of the law by refusing the only
effective sanction to ensure such protection, then it must be taken
that Parliament in 1960 enacted basic standards with which the old
common law rule on admissability of illegal evidence cannot stand.
If this is sound, then the evidentiary rule of relevance must now be
taken to be qualified by the CanadianBill of Rights in favour of a
prior rule of construction in favour of the individual's right to the
protection of the law.
This need not lead to an absolute rule of exclusion of illegal
evidence, but rather an assessment in each case of whether, in the
circumstances, the judicial sanction of refusing admission of
evidence is necessary to secure the right to the protection of the law.
This approach at least opens the door to the possibility of applying
judicial sanctions to protect the rights and freedoms of the Bill of
Rights where it is appropriate to do so. The majority in Hogan seem
to have said that the common law rule must prevail because it has
been around for a long time. This interpretation of the Bill of Rights
looks more like a non-application and seems an odd way to show
judicial respect for the supremacy of Parliament, which has
expressed its desire that its Bill of Rights "shall ensure the
protection of these rights and freedoms in Canada."
The majority, I suggest, made no attempt to construe the law of
Canada on admissability of evidence according to section 2 of the
Bill of Rights. They simply re-affirmed the authority of that rule in
spite of the Bill ofRights.
The time has come for a summing up of this rather lengthy
analysis. This will be done in two stages: first, I will list the rights
and freedoms set out in section 1 of the Bill, trying to give each its
full description; second, I will list the various propositions that have
been made in this analysis about the CanadianBill ofRights and its
development up to 1975.
A.
1.
2.

The Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Recognized
andDeclared by section I of the CanadianBill ofRights
The right to life without discrimination by reason of race,
national origin, colour, religion or sex (hereafter race, etc.)
The right to liberty without discrimination by reason of race,
etc.
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The right to security of the person without discrimination by
reason of race, etc.
4. The right to enjoyment of property without discrimination by
reason of race, etc.
5.
The right to due process law before being deprived of any of 1
to 4.
6. The right to equality before the law without discrimination by
reason of race, etc.
7. The right to the protectionof the law without discrimination by
reason of race, etc.
8. Freedom of religion without discrimination by reasons of race,
etc.
9. Freedom of speech without discrimination by reason of race,
etc.
10. Freedom of assembly and association without discrimination
by reason of race, etc.
11. Freedom of the press without discrimination by reason of race,
etc.
B. Summary of Propositions Concerning the Canadian Bill of
Rights and its Development
1. The Bill of Rights is authority primarily for judicial protection
of rights and freedoms from interference through
administrative action. Drybones is an exceptional case
because an impasse in the interpretative process was reached.
2. The IndianAct is likely to yield many such exceptional cases,
since it enacts special laws for members of a racial group, and
should therefore be declared to operate notwithstanding the
Canadian Bill of Rights in order to free judicial development
of the Bill of the nagging sense of impropriety the judges
obviously feel.
3.
The Indian Affairs Branch should be charged with responsibility for bring Indian laws and practices into harmony with the
values expressed by the CanadianBill of Rights by bringing
forward legislative amendments, enacting subordinate legislation and taking administrative action.
4. The judicial approach taken in Drybones was misguided. It
was not necessary to invoke the difficult concept of equality
before the law. Drybones' complaint was that the imposition
of a fine was an infringement of his "right to enjoyment of
3.
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property without discrimination by reason of race." It is worth
noting that the Indian Act runs afoul of the Bill of Rights on
this basis of racial discrimination only when it is one of the
Bill's section 1 human rights and fundamental freedoms that is
being prejudiced.
5.

The Lavell case also did not require consideration of the
concept of equality before the law. Mrs. Lavell's complaint
was that she had been subjected to a substantial abridgment, if
not abrogation, of her right to security of the person and her
right to the enjoyment of property by reason of her sex. If
equality before the law is to be applied to Lavell, the way to do
it is to assert a denial of equality before the law by reason of
race. That is, it is only because of her race that Mrs. Lavell is
denied equality with men in relation to the consequences of
marrying a non-Indian. Which is to say nothing more than that
the law in question is found in the Indian Act, a statute that
applies exclusively to a single race. Since the offending
provision takes its colour from its surroundings (a racial
statute), it is probably more consistent to formulate Mrs.
Lavell's case as one of infringement of the "right to equality
before the law without discrimination by reason of race." That
is, different rights for men and women are part of Indian
policy, for better or for worse, and find their origin in section
91 (24) of the BNA Act. This eliminates racial discrimination.
However, when we move on to the rights to security of the
person and the enjoyment of property without discrimination
by reason of sex we encounter an absolute legislative
prohibition and the conflict is to be resolved, I submit, by
inferring that the Bill of Rights was meant to override such
discrimination even where it is authorized by the Indian Act as
part of special laws for Indians.

6.

Canard did not involve one of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms set out in the Bill of Rights. The claim
to equality before the law is strained beyond credibility
because, as the majority point out, the Constitution itself
removes Indians from being subject to provincial laws as a
matter of course. Therefore, there is no denial of a human right
by reason of race. Is there then a direct infringement of the
right to equality before the law? This, too, seems strained,
since the Constitution decrees that that kind of equality before
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the law shall not exist as of right. The Bill's application is thus
re-directed to the lowest level of generality, that is, to the
particular case. If, on all the facts, no justification for
differential treatment exists in the instant case, the administrative authority can be required to accord the broadest kind of
equality before the law if the statute will bear the necessary
interpretation. If it will not, the court faces the kind of
quandary which leads to the suggestion that the Indian Act be
removed from the purview of theBill ofRights.

